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NOTES AND COMMENTS
NAVIGABLE AIR SPACE AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
The Air Space Act of 1926 contains the following provisions:
"Sec. 10. Navigable Airspace. As used in this Act, the term 'navigable
airspace' means airspace above the minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Secretary of Commerce under Section 3, and such navigable
airspace shall be subject to a public right of freedom of interstate and foreign air navigation in conformity with the requirements of this Act."
"Sec. 4. Airspace Reservations. The President is authorized to provide
by Executive order for the setting apart and the protection of airspace reservations in the United States for national defense or other governmental purposes and, in addition, in the District of Columbia for public safety purposes.
The several States may set apart and provide for the protection of necessary
airspace reservations in addition to and not in conflict either with airspace
reservations established by the President under this section or with any
civil or military airway under the provisions of this Act."
"Sec. 5. (b) The Secretary of Commerce is authorized to designate and
establish civil airways and, within the limits of available appropriations hereafter made by the Congress, (1) to establish, operate, and maintain along
such airways all necessary air navigation facilities except airports; and (2)
to chart such airways and arrange for publication of maps of such airways,
utilizing the facilities and assistance of existing agencies of the Government
so far as practicable. The Secretary of Commerce shall grant no exclusive
right for the use of any civil airway airport, emergency landing field, or other
air navigation facility under his jurisdiction."
"Sec. 5. (f) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prevent the Secretary of War from designating routes in the navigable airspace as military
airways and prescribing rules and regulations for the use thereof on routes
which do not conform to civil airways, established hereunder, or to prevent
the Secretary of Commerce from designating any military airway as a civil
airway, and when so designated it shall thereupon become a civil airway
within the meaning of this Act, and the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to continue the operation of air navigation facilities for any military
airway so designated as a civil airway until such time as the Secretary of
Commerce can provide for the operation of such facilities."
"Sec. 11. Penalties. (a) It shall be unlawful, except to the extent
authorized or exempt under Secion 6.
(1) To navigate any aircraft within any airspace reservation otherwise
than in conformity with the Executive orders regulating such reservation.
(5) To navigate any aircraft otherwise than in conformity with the
air traffic rules."
[346]
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The effect of these provisions on the property rights of landowners is a matter of general interest. The wsque ad coelum theory
of property rights in land was practically destroyed by the invention of the airplane. If that theory were to be maintained, sec. 10
would be unconstitutional as depriving the landowner of property
without due process of law. The actual legal situation appears to
be this: There was always a latent easement for air travel which
is described in sec. 10. This latent easement became a patent easement when air traffic was sufficiently developed to make the easement important.
Under sec. 4 a different question arises with reference to airspace reservations. It is by no means clear that the public right of
air navigation described in sec. 10, or the complete sovereignty of
the airspace set forth in sec. 6, gives the United States any right to
set apar any airspace reservations without making compensation
therefor. The effect of this provision, coupled with the provisions
of sec. 11, is to make it unlawful for a ranch-owner to fly an airplane over his own ranch if an airspace reservation, including air
over that ranch, has been designated by the President, or by the
several States. The effect of this provision is to deprive the landowner of the use of his property, and as such deprivation is made
without any compensation to the landowner, its constitutionality
is at least doubtful. It is hard to see how the power to make a
reservation for space in the air is any greater than that to make
a reservation for space on the ground. The ground space cannot
be reserved without compensation, and there seems no reason for
a different rule with reference to the airspace.
The establishment of airways rests on quite a different basis
from the establishment of airspace reservations. The establishment of airways merely provides for the direction of air traffic.
The establishment of airspace reservations provides for the exclusion of air traffic from the reservations.
The power of Congress to establish airways rests on its power
to control interstate commerce. The power to establish airspace
reservations can apparently rest only on the right of eminent domain. Congress, however, has taken a different view of the matter
and seeks to appropriate airspace reservations without compensation. The chances appear to be against the courts sustaining this
provision.
Washington, D. C.

EDWARD A. HARRIMAN.
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RESPONSIBILITY OF AIRPORT OWNERS
The following news item from the New York Herald Tribune
of January 23, 1930. shows the importance of legislation for the
protection of the owners and operators of airports. Whether the
term "palpable negligence" is used in the bill, or is merely the
phraseology of the reporter, does not appear. Negligence hitherto
has been classed as gross, ordinary, and slight. The meaning of
the term "palpable" appears to await judicial determination.
ALBANY, Jan. 23.-Owners and operators of aircraft and landing fields
would be relieved of responsibility for personal injuries in aircraft accidents
except in the case of palpable negligence, under terms of a bill offered in
the Legislature today by Senator J. Griswold Webb, of Hyde Park, and
Assemblyman Herbert B. Shonk, of Scarsdale, chairman and vice-chairman,
respectively, of the State Aviation Commission. At the same time Senator
Webb and Assemblyman Shonk proposed a bill extending for one year from
March 1 the life of the commission, now the only state body exercising regulation over aeronautics.
There is considerable uncertainty as to responsibility after aircraft accidents, Senator Webb said, which is placing unnecessary obstacles before the
progress of aviation in some sections of the state.
"We have had instances," he said, "indicating the necessity for such a bill.
I might refer specifically to one excellent private landing field in the Adirondacks. It is the only available landing field for miles, and it was suggested
that the owners might mark it in the usual way indicating it as a landing
field. They had no objection to such use of the field, but their counsel informed them that, under the present wording of the law, they might be held
responsible for any accident that might occur on the field to a plane whose
pilot accepted the implied invitation to land there. This is manifestly unfair,
so long as the field is in good condition."

Washington, D. C.

EDWARD A. HARRIMAN.

AIR TRANSPORTATION COMPANIES AS COMMON
CARRIERS
In the January number of the Journal of Air Law, page 38,
the writer called attention to the attempt of counsel for air transportation companies to exclude by contract the liability of such
companies as common carriers. This subject is receiving widespread public attention, as is shown by the following extract from
a speech by Senator Bratton of New Mexico.
"One other thing, Mr. President: It has been suggested that these companies are private carriers and consequently cannot be controlled. I entertain not the slightest doubt that a company engaged in transporting persons
and property for hire from a point within one State to a point within another
State, even though the transportation takes place through the air, is a common
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carrier. The fact that a railroad company drives its trains along the face
of the earth and an aviation company drives its ships through the air, both
transporting property and passengers for hire, does not differentiate the two
by making one a common carrier and the other a private carrier.
"The essential element constituting a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce is that it transports persons and/or property for hire between
points in different States. An aviation company doing that is essentially a
common carrier and consequently subject to regulation. It borders on the
point of absurdity to assert that a company which contracts to carry and
actually it carries passengers say from Cleveland, Ohio, to Los Angeles, Cal.,
is a private carrier. If has in it every element of being a common carrier.
Yet some of the companies contend that they are private carriers. The T.
A. T. Co., which operates its planes from Columbus, Ohio, to a point in
Oklahoma, and then from points in New Mexico to points in California,
notably carries the statement upon gome of its literature and in some of its
advertising matter that it is a private carrier. The company itself should
not engage in any such evasion. Whethei it is regulated or unregulated, it
becomes a common carrier the moment it engages in the business of carrying property and persons for hire between points in different States."

Mr. Bratton, in Congressional Record, January 28, 1930, p.
2587.
Washington, D. C.

EDWARD A. HARRIMAN.
NOTES

RADIO ACT OF 1927-INTERPRETATION OF STANDARD OF "PUBLIC INTEREST, CONVENIENCE OR NECESSITY" AS APPLIED TO BROADCASTING STATIoNs.-The Radio Act of 1927, as amended by the
Act of March 28, 1928,' prescribes the standard of "public interest, convenience or necessity" for the guidance of the Federal Radio
Commission in the exercise of its function with respect to the granting or refusal of applications for construction permits, station licenses, renewals of license, and modifications of license. 2 The question of the proper interpretation of this standard is squarely raised
in two recent cases decided by the Court of Appeals of the District
of Columbia on appeal from the Commission."
The first of these cases, Great Lakes Broadcasting Co.
(WENR) v. Federal Radio Commission,' involved a controversy
between three stations in the Chicago area, WENR, WLS, and
WCBD, regarding the disposition of operating time on the "cleared"
channel of 870 kc. By the general reallocation of Nov. 11, 1928
(incident to its General Order 40), the Commission had continued WLS on that channel with 5/7 time and had assigned WENR
1. 44 Stat. 1162; 47 U. S. C. (Supp. 1928) Sec. 81.
2. See Sections 9, 11 and 21 of the Act.
3. Section 16 provides an appeal to the Court of Appeals of the District
of Columbia from certain decisions of the Federal Radio Commission.
4. 37 F. (2d) 993 (decided Jan. 6, 1930).
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to the channel with 2/7 time. WCBD had been removed from 870 kc.
and assigned to a less desirable channel. Each station applied for
modification of its assignment: WLS asking full time use of the
channel, WENR, full or 1/2 instead of 2/7 time, and WCBD applying for reinstatement on 870 kc. with 2/7 time. The three applications were heard together by four of the five Commissioners and,
the Commission having divided equally as to the proper disposition
to be made, each application was denied. The applicants severally
appealed to the Court of Appeals where the three appeals were
treated as consolidated.
The Commission in its statement of grounds for decision enunciated the general underlying principles held by it to inhere in the
standard of "public interest, convenience or necessity.",, Although
the members differed as to the proper application of these principles
in the particular controversy, the general principles set forth were
unanimously approved by the Commission.
The Commission emphasized priority of service as the first consideration in the application of the standard:
"The first important general principle in the validity of which the
Commission believes is that, as between two broadcasting stations with
otherwise equal claims for privileges, the station which has the longest
record of continuous service has the superior right."
As between WENR and WLS, Station WLS not only was prior in
establishment, but had used high power long before WENR,1 and
had been operating on the channel in question before WENR was
assigned to it. The Court of Appeals, although it found no fault
with the quality of service rendered by WLS, ordered its time of
operation cut down from 5/7 to 1/2, and the time of WENR increased from 2/7 to 1/2. The established priority rights of WLS
were dismissed with the words:
"It is true that WLS began broadcasting some time earlier than
WENR, and that it was the first to be assigned to the channel in question. These facts, however, are not controlling, for neither station has
any fixed right in the frequency as against the reasonable regulatory
power of thd United States." (P. 995.)

It would seem that the court ignores the vital question at issue,
5. This was the first comprehensive statement issued by the Commission
regarding the proper interpretation of the standard, although statements
issued at the close of the hearings under General Order 32 in the summer of
1928 constituted a partial interpretation (Second Annual Report, pp. 152-170).
It is quoted in part in the Third Annual Report, p. 32 et seq.
6. The Commission was careful to explain that as between stations of
different classes (for example, a cleared channel station of 10,000 watts and
a local station of 100 watts) the principle of priority may not control. Even
though the smaller station may have a longer record of continuous service,
it manifestly has not as long a record of service over the larger area. In the
instant case, however, all three stations were in the same class. See Statement of Ground for Decision filed by the Commission.
7. Thereby having a longer record of service covering a large service
area.
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for the real question is not whether there is a fixed right as against
an exercise of a reasonable regulatory power, but whether a reasonable regulation would not be based upon a recognition of priority,
other elements being equal.
The Court of Appeals also considered priority rights in the
Federation of Labor (WCFL) v. Federal
second case, Chicago
Radio Commission.8 Station WCFL applied for modification of its
license to authorize full time operation and transfer to the cleared
channel of 770 kc., upon which WBBM and KFAB were then
dividing time. Upon the denial of its application by the Commission, WCFL appealed to the Court of Appeals. The court upheld
the rights of WBBM and KFAB, the established stations, and affirmed the decision of the Commission, saying in part:
"It is not consistent with true public convenience, interest or necessity that meritorious stations like WBBM and KFAB should be deprived
of broadcasting privileges when once granted to them . . . unless

clear and sound reasons of public policy demand such action. The cause
of independent broadcasting in general would be seriously endangered
and public interests correspondingly prejudiced, if the licenses of established stations should arbitrarily be withdrawn from them and appropriated to the use of other stations."
The standard of "public interest, convenience or necessity" in
the Radio Act of 1927 undoubtedly derives from the similar standard of "public convenience and necessity" appearing in the public
utilities laws of the states,0 as the guide for state commissions in
granting certificates of convenience and necessity.'"
8.

No. 4972, decided May 5, 1930, U. S. Daily, May 9, 1930 (not yet

reported).
9. See the scholarly opinion of judge Wilkerson in United States v.
American Bond & Mortgage Co., 31 F. (2d) 448, 457.

10. The close resemblance between a certificate of convenience and

necessity and a license to operate a commercial radio station is apparent.
State statutes requiring certificates of public convenience and necessity
before permitting a person to enter a given business are an express recognition of the economic, and often physical, limitations upon the number of
persons who may, consistently with public welfare, be permitted to engage in
that business. The most important economic considerations are found in the
evils of excessive competition in naturally monopolistic businesses, due to ex-

tensive duplication of equipment and overhead which will eventually be re-

flected in rates charged the public, and possibly inadequate service. Obvious
physical considerations arise in all those businesses which involve the use of
streets, bridges or other public property, or which necessitate condemnation
of private property. See Texas & P. R. Co. v. Gulf, C. ' S. F. R. Co.,
270 U. S.266, 277; People ex tel Public Serv. Comm., 227 N. Y. 248, 125

248, 141 N. E. 12; Chicago,
N. E. 438; Choate v. Ill. Comm. Comm., 309 Ill.
R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. State, 126 Okla. 48, 258 Pac. 874; McLain v. Pub. Util.
Comm., 110 Ohio S.1, 143 N. E. 381.
In the field of radio communication the limitation is primarily physical:
it is an inexorable principle of radio engineering that the number of persons
who may simultaneously engage in radio broadcasting is definitely limited.
See scientific principles set forth in United States v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., 31 F. (2d) 448, 452-454; 1929 Report, Standing Committee on Radio

Law (Amer. Bar Assoc.), p. 410 et seq.

In both fields of regulatioi the object to be attained is the development of
an adequate service for the public.
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In the granting of certificates of convenience and necessity
the general rule is well established that a state commission will
not allow a new utility to enter a field already occupied by another
similar utility.11 The corollary of this rule is that when the choice
of applicants for operation in a new field lies between a new utility
and a utility occupying an adjacent field, the existing utility is entitled to preference. 12 To these rules there are admittedly exceptions, namely (a) where the service rendered by the existing utility
is unsatisfactory and inadequate,' 8 and (b) where4 the new utility
offers a new kind of service desirable to the public.'
Applying these principles to the WENR case it is difficult to
understand the theory of the Court of Appeals in taking time away
from WLS, the senior station, in order to give it to the junior station, WENR, inasmuch as the court acknowledged the excellence
of the service rendered by WLS, and inasmuch as WENR did not
propose any new service that WLS was not prepared to give.
In both the WENR case and the WCFL case the Commission,
in its statement of grounds for decision, emphasized the proposition
that the interest, convenience or necessity to be considered was that
of the public at large and not that of individual broadcasters or of
any particular sect, class or organization.'
Both with respect to
the claims of station WCBD (owned by Wilbur Glenn Voliva, head
of a religious sect at Zion, Illinois), and those of station WCFL
(owned by the Chicago Federation of Labor and purporting to be
the voice of organized labor), the Commission definitely stated that
11. Red Star Transp. Co. v. Red Dot Coach Lines, 220 Ky. 424, 295 S. W.
419; McLain v. Public Utilities Commission, 110 Oh. St. 1, 143 N. E. 381;
Abbott v. Public Commission, 48 R. I. 196, 136 Atl. 490; State ex rel. v. Atkinson, 275 Mo. 324, 204 S. W. 897; West Suburban Transp. Co. v. Chi. & W.
T. R. Co., 309 Ill. 87, 140 N. E. 56; Superior Motor Bus Co. v. Community
Motor Bus Co., 320 Il1. 175, 150 N. E. 668; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v.
State, 126 Okla. 48, 258 Pac. 874; Fornarotto v. Board qf Pub. Util. Com.
(N. J.) 143 Atl. 450. In a large number of states the commission is directed
by statute to consider the transportation service already furnished and the
effect which the proposed service would have upon it.
12. This rule is supported by several strong decisions. Chicago Motor
Bus Co. v. Chicago Stage Co., 287 Ill. 320, 122 N. E. 477; Monongahela West
Penn. Pub. Serv. Co. v. -StateRoad Comanission, 104 W. Va. 183, 139 S. E. 744.
See also Chicago Ry. Co. v. Commerce Comm., 336 Ill. 51, 167 N. E. 840.
13. Even in this case by the majority rule, the existing utility is given an
opportunity to improve its service before another will be allowed to enter the
territory. See Choate v. Ill. Comm. Comm., 309 Ill. 248, 141 N. E. 12.
14. These exceptions tend to overlap in practice. See as illustrations of
the exceptions, Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. State, 126 Okla. 48, 258 Pac.
874; Bartonville Bus Line v. Eagle Line, 326 11. 200, 157 N. E. 175; United
Parcel Service (Cal.), P. U. R. 1926 E, 321; Coast Counties Gas & Electric
Co. v. Sierra & S. F. Power Co. (Cal.) P. U. R. 1917 C, 709.
15. See the similar principle enunciated by the courts with respect to
certificates of convenience and necessity in the public utility field. Milw. Ry.
& Light Co. v. Milw. County, 189 Wis. 96, 206 N. W. 201; Fornarotto v.
Board of Pub. Util. Com. (N. J.), 143 Atl. 450; McLain v. Pub. Util. Com.,
110 Oh. S. 1, 143 N. E. 381; Red Star Transp. Co. v. Red Dot Coach Lines,
200 Ky. 424, 295 S. W. 419; Choate v. Ill. Comm. Comm., 309 Ill. 248, 141 N.
E. 12.
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propaganda stations must give way to general public service stations
when choice must be made between them. This principle seems

inherently sound, but the Court of Appeals did not mention it in
the decisions rendered.
In passing it should be noted that the Court of Appeals in the
WCFL case expressly approved the rule of procedure adopted by

the Commission requiring an applicant to specify the particular frequency desired. The rule was objected to on the ground. that it
throws the applicant into a controversy with the stations already occupying the frequency. The Court very wisely said, in answer to

this objection:
"The number of available broadcasting frequencies is limited and
they are so interrelated that none can be considered wholly without
reference to others. It is necessary in the interests of justice that if
new allotments are to be considered which may substantially affect those
already granted to other stations, the latter should be notified and be
permitted to intervene in the proceeding."
Member of the Chicago Bar.

KEITH MASTERS.

RADIO ACT OF 1927-APPEAL FROM FEDERAL RADIO COMMIsSIoN-FuNCTION OF COURT OF APPEALS OF DISTRICT OF COLUM-

BIA.-The case of Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric
Company' involved these facts. A New York station, WGY, applied
for full time operation on a cleared channel which the Commission
had assigned for exclusive evening use in the Fifth zone (the Rocky
Mountain and Pacific Coast States).' The Commission denied full
time to WGY. and issued instead a renewal license specifying limited
time. From this decision of the Commission WGY perfected an
appeal to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.8 That
court reversed the decision of the Commission and ordered that

1. No. 122, Supreme Court of the*United States, decided May 19, 1930,
Adv. Ops. 1929-1930, p. 514.
2. By its General Order 40 of August 30, 1928, the Commission designated
forty broadcasting channels or frequencies as "cleared" or "exclusive" channels, upon each of which only one station would be allowed to operate during
the evening hours, and allocated these cleared channels equally among the five
zones created by the Radio Act (Sec. 2).
The Commission made this reallocation because of the mandate it believed
to be-contained in the Davis Amendment of 1928 (Public Law No. 195, 70th
Cong.).
3. Section 16 of the Radio Act of 1927 (44 Stat. 1162) provides that any
applicant for a construction permit, for a station license or for the renewal or
modification of an existing station license, whose application is refused by the
Federal Radio Commission, may appeal from such decision to the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia; directs that the grounds of appeal be
stated and the revision be confined to them; requires the Commission to
transmit a record together with a statement of the facts and grounds of its
decision; allows the court to take additional evidence; and provides that the
court "shall hear, review and determine the appeal upon said record and evidence, and may alter or revise the decision appealed from and enter such
judgment as to it may seem just."
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WGY be allowed unlimited time on the channel in question.4 The
Commission then applied for and was granted a writ of certiorari
by the Supreme Court. Writ of certiorari dismissed. Held: that
the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to review a decision of the
Court of Appeals rendered on appeal from the Federal Radio Commission.
The courts after an examination of the pertinent provisions
of the Radio Act, stated that a decision rendered by the Court of
Appeals on appeal from the Commission is not a judicial judgment,
but is a mere administrative or legislative decision, 5 and that the
Supreme Court being invested by the Constitution with judicial
power only, cannot review such decisions.'
The Supreme Court did not discuss the various objections urged
against the theory that the Court of Appeals exercises administrative functions on appeal from the Commission. Section 16, which
allows an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a decision of the
Commission refusing an application, allows an appeal from a decision of revocation of license to district courts of the United States
(as well as to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia).
The procedure provided is exactly the same, including the provision
for additional evidence and the scope of the judgment which may
be entered by the appellate tribunal. It was argued that since it is
not constitutionally possible to confer administrative or legislative
powers on a District Court,' the Act contemplated that both appellate
tribunals should exercise judicial functions.
The decision ignored the action of the Court of Appeals in
issuing a stay order requiring the Commission to refrain from interfering with WGY pending the appeal. The Court of Appeals has
repeatedly issued such stay orders and this function, it would seem,
is only consonant with a judicial power."! The Supreme Court
waved aside the further fact that the Court of Appeals assessed
4. Reported as General Electric Company v. Federal Radio Commission,
31 F. (2d) 630. See notes, 42 Harvard Law Review 948; 28 Mich. L. R. 194.

5. The Supreme Court declares that the province of the Court.of Appeals
under the Radio Act of 1927 is comparable to its former province on appeals
from administrative decisions of the Commissioner of Patents (Sections 59-62,
title U. S. C.) before that jurisdiction was transferred to the .Court of Cus-

toms & Patent Appeals by, the Act of Mar. 2, 1929, c. 488, 45 Stat. 1475.

6. Kellgr v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U. S. 428, 444; Postum
Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U. S.693, 700-701.

Congress, of course, has pqwer to invest the Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia with the functions of an administrative tribunal,. inasmuch as that court is not a constitutional court. Keller v. Potomac Electric
Power Co., supra.
7. Keller v. Potomac Electric Co., supra: Ex Parte Bakelite Corporation,

279 U. S.438; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
279 U. S.716.
8. In re McFarland, 30 App. D. C. 365.
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costs against the Commission, 9 which would most certainly appear
to be a characteristic of judicial decision.1 0
This decision fixes the status of the Court of Appeals as a
super-Commission, and, perforce, places parties complaining of the
Commission in a rather difficult position. Suppose the Commission
makes a clearly erroneous decision substantially affecting the rights
of a station, and that this decision is wrongly affirmed by the Court
of Appeals; since appeal to the Supreme Court is denied, the only
remedy left the station (other than the possibility of an action against
its opponent station or stations) is suit for injunction restraining
the Commission, or other extraordinary remedy,1 in the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia. The appeal from this latter
court is to the Court of Appeals, which we are assuming has already erred in this very controversy; so the circle is complete, except for review in the Supreme Court of the United States on writ
of certiorari.
Member of the Chicago Bar.
KEITH MASTERS.
RADIO ACT OF 1927-APPEAL FROM FEDERAL RADIO COMMISSIoN-APPEALABLE DEcIsIoN.-Appellant was one of a group of

press associations and newspapers, seeking authority to engage in
point-to-point wireless telegraphy. On Dec. 22, 1928, the Commission approved' individual applications of members of this group
asking permission to construct stations for point-to-point press communication, but the construction permits were never actually issued
because of differences thereafter arising within the group. Appellant, dissatisfied with the number of channels allocated to it,
repudiated the action of the Commission. On June 20, 1929, the
Commission revoked its action of Dec. 22, 1928, and ordered the
construction permits to be issued to a trustee for the group as a
whole. Appellant appealed from this decision to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, alleging that it Was thereby deprived of rights acquired under the order of Dec. 22nd. Held: that
appellant had no grounds for appeal. Appeal dismissed.2
In its decision the court adopts a strict construction as to what
constitutes an appealable decision of the Commission. Section 16
of the Radio Act of 19271 provides that an appeal may be taken to
the Court of Appeals from a decision of the Commission denying
9. It is interesting to note that the Court of Appeals has not subsequently assessed costs in any appeal from the Commission, although the
Commission's decision have been reversed in two instances since the WGY
case. 10. See
Tesla Electric Co. v. Scott et al.,
101 Fed. 524.
11. In Technical Radio Laboratory v. Comewission, 36 F. (2d) 111 (C. A.,
D. C. NoL 19291, it was hinted that such a suit might lie.
I.

The exact natur. and effect of the Commission's order of this date

was in issue.
2. Universal Service Wireless, Inc. v. Federal Radio Cosnwassion, No.
5005, Court of Appeals of District of Columbia, decided May 5, 1930, U. S.
Daily, May 8, 1930 (not yet reported).

3. 44 Stat. 1162.
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an application for (a) construction -permit, (b)
renewal of existing license, or (d) modification
The court examined the grounds thus specified,
did not expressly fall within one of the four
missed the appeal, saying:

station license, (c)
of existing license.
held that applicant
specified, and dis-

"The right of appeal being a statutory one, the court cannot dispense
with its express provisions, even to the extent of doing equity."
This represents a recession from the liberal position regarding appealable decisions taken by the court in Richmond Development
Corporation v. Federal Radio Commission" where an application
for extension of time when the station should be completed (which
is required to be specified in construction permits) was treated as
an application for a construction permit and a denial of the application by the Commission was regarded as'an appealable decision
although there had been two previous extensions and the last extension had expired 15 days before the application in question was
made.'
KEITH MASTERS.
Member of the Chicago Bar.
RADIO ACT OF 1927-REGULATIONS FOR PREVENTION OF INTERFERENCE UNDER SECTION 4(F)-POWER OF COMMISSION TO MAKE
CHANGES IN STATION ASSIGNMENTS WITHOUT PRIOR HEARING.-

In its statements of grounds for decision in Courier-Journaland
Louisville Times Co. (WHAS) v. Commission' the Federal Radio
Commission attempts to justify its General Order No. 87 of April
7, 1930, and the changes in broadcasting station assignments made
pursuant thereto. Under the Commission's action WHAS was to
have undergone a 'change in frequency from 820 kc. to 1020 kc.
The point made by the Commission that Section 4(f) of the
Radio Act of 1927 gives it power to make such changes in station
assignments without opportunity for hearing to the stations affected
prior, to the effective date of the changes has been discussed at
length in the writer's article appearing in this issue of the JOURNAL8
OF AIR LAW. 2 The Commission, in citing the City of New York
4
and Great Lakes Broadcastngq Co. cases in support of its action,
11, 1928 (which
November
of
fails to note that the reallocation
was based on General Order No. 40 of August 30, 1928, and a
tentative allocation announced September 11, 1928), was preceded
by opportunity for hearing during a period of two months, under a
4. 35 F. (2d) 883 (decided Nov. 4, 1929).

5. See Practice & Procedure before the Federal Radio Commission,
Louis G. Caldwell, JOURNAL OF AIR LAW, Vol. I, p. 144, at p. 159.

1. Court of Appeals, Dist. of Col., Special Calendar, No. 5190.

2. Appeals from Decisions of the Federal Radio Commission; see also
Practice and Procedure before the Federal Radio Commission, J. of A. L.,

Vo. I, No. 2 (April, 1930), p. 157.
3. 36 F. (2d) 115.
4.

37 F. (2d) 993.
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procedure announced on September 11, 1928, which contemplated
that all dissatisfied stations might be heard prior to the effective
date. The Commission's reduction of WGY's hours of operation,
which was held in the General Electric Company case 5 to be a denial
of a renewal application and appealable, was made pursuant to General Order 40 (of which General Order 87 is simply an amendment).
The important feature of the statement, however, is that, for the
first time in the history of the Commission, a basis for minimum
geographical separation between stations on the same and on adjacent channels is formally established. This is done in terms
of a unit denominated an "interference mile." What the unit is,
and on what basis it has been calculated, do not appear in the statement, but a chart is set forth tabulating the minimum mileage separation which should exist between stations of equal power. The chart
is as follows:
Power
50 Watts

100 "
250 "
500 "
1 Kilowatt
5 "
10 "
15
"
25 "

50

"

On Same
Frequency
220 Mi.
300 "
650 "
900"
1200 "
1850 "

2200
2400
2600

3000

"
"
"
"

Separated
by 10 kc.
63 Mi.
"
"
"
"
"
"
680 "
750 "
860 "

85
185
250
350
530
630

Separated
by 20 kc.
30 Mi.
40
90
125"
170
260
320
340
370
430

"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"

Separated
by 30 kc.
22 Mi.
30
65
90"
120
180
220
240
260
300

The statement announces that the chart has been adopted by the
Commission.,a

It is possible to criticize the standard set up in the chart as
still being far too low, but allowance must be made for the practical situation with which the Commission is faced on account the
grossly excessive number of broadcasting stations and its past failures to reduce the number. Until the number is reduced (particularly of regional stations) technical ideals must be sacrificed. For
example, it has commonly been considered necessary that, for good
(not to mention excellent) results, 500 watt stations should be
separated by 1200 miles and 1000 watt stations by 1800 miles and
that 5000 watt stations should not be duplicated anywhere in the
country on the same channel. The chart seems to forecast the destruction of some of the cleared channels unless stations now assigned to those channels obtain sufficient increases in power. If
the chart is. open to such an interpretation it constitutes pro tanto
a serious step backward from General Order No. 40 and the reallocation of November 11, 1928.6
5. 31 F. (2d) 630.

5a. Since the above was written, the writer has been informed that this
tabulation has not been officially adopted by the Commission, but that it was

prepared by its engineering division for its own use.

6. This was the judgment of Dr. J. H. Dellinger, Chief of Radio Section, Bureau of Standards (formerly chief engineer of the Commission),
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The small minimum geographical separations on adjacent channels shown in the chart are also hard to justify technically, especially
in comparison with the separations proposed, on channels removed
20 kc. and 30 kc. from the principal channel. Their correctness,
of course, depends a great deal upon what degree of selectivity
of receiving apparatus is taken as a standard, as well as upon what
particular frequency is in question.
Nevertheless, the fact that such a chart has been adopted represents a stride forward in the reduction of interference in the broadcast band (except in so far as it may be used to destroy cleared
channels). The failure.on the part of the Commission to adopt
and observe any minimum standards in the past had led to the virtual
destruction of good reception on practically all of the local and
regional channels. On some twenty-four of the regional channels
there are geographical separations of from 650 down to slightly over
200 miles between stations on the same channel which ought to be
separated, 7 under the Commission's figures, by at least 900 to 1200
miles. While it will take time to make the existing set-up conform to the standards specified in the chart, the standards should
serve at least as a bulwark against any further sacrifice of the interest of the listening public to the insistence of individual broadcasters (provided, of course, that the present number of cleared
channels is not diminished). It is to be hoped that, instead of
definitely adhering to these standards, the Commission will take
steps to bring them to a higher level.
The portion of the statement in which the Commission attempts to justify General Order 87 and its application to the particular stations affected is not altogether convincing. The Commission claims that its action would improve interference conditions
on sixteen cleared channels for a total of 3676 interference miles;
that conditions would be unchanged on three cleared channels; and
that on three cleared channels there would be a total loss of 143
interference miles. To reach these totals, however, the Commission
has had to disregard cases where a reduction in geographical separation was brought about between stations on adjacent cleared chanJohn V. L. Hogan and C. M. Jansky, Jr., in testimony heard by the Commission on July 23, 1928. See Radio Facts and Principles, Govt. Pr. Off.
1928. The standards agreed to by these eminent authorities have frequently
been urged by the Commission before the Court of Appeals, and were set
forth in its brief filed with the United States Supreme Court in Federal Radio
Commission v. General Electric Co., Adv. Ops., 1929-1930, p. 514. The basis
for them is set forth in U. S. v. American Bond & Mortgage -Co., et al,
31 F. (2d) 448. See Report of Standing Committee on Radio Law, A. B. A.
Reps., 1929, Vol. 54, pp. 424-426.
7. The low technical standards which some of the Commission's engineers
have testified to recently in hearings before the Commission are illustrated by
the Commission's statement just filed in Bennett v. Commission, No. 5208.
In this case the engineer testified that "during winter months heterodyne
interference would be caused by stations of 1000 watts power in a radius of
500 to 700 miles operating on the same frequency." Such tecessions from
sound principles are hard to justify, and res.ult in encouraging the everinsistent pressure for the authorization of new stations.
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nels but the reductions were not great enough to bring the separation below the minimum distance shown on the chart. This method
of calculation ignores a fundamental fact. Interference between
stations on adjacent channels cannot be dealt with in absolute terms.
No matter how far apart from each other (unless the distance is so
great that detectible signals from the two stations do not anywhere
penetrate the same area), stations on adjacent 10 kc. channels will
cause cross-talk to each other som-ewhere in the intervening area.
The greater the geographical separation, the greater the interferencefree area will be for each station; any reduction in the geographical
separation will reduce the service area of the station and decrease
its listening public.
The figures set forth in the above chart do not mean, therefore,
that the specified separations will obviate interference, but merely
that they will probably avoid substantial interference over a service
area which the Commission has apparently arbitrarily determined
upon as a proper one to be expected by a given station, the dimensions of which have not, however, been made public.
According to the Commission's figures, WHAS was scheduled
to suffer a loss of 25 interference miles. It is common knowledge
that 1020 kc. is substantially inferior to 820 kc. (although both are
cleared channels), the lower frequencies being capable of reliable
service over a greater area free from fading, less subject to absorption by steel buildings, etc. WHAS should, therefore, have an opportunity in some forum to have it determined whether any considerations of public interest, convenience or necessity, require
that it be subjected to this injury.
There is no need for apprehension over the number of hearings which may, result from compliance with thq provisions of
Section 11 of the Act by affording a prior hearing to stations adversely dffected by such action of the Commission as General Order
87. Of the 26 stations involved in the shifts all but three acquiesced.
The issues at such a hearing, where the respective merits of the
stations in program service are not directly in question, probably
may be confined to the technical considerations on which the Commission relies in justification for its action and with respect to which
the Commission's engineers may or may not be right. If they are
right no harm is done; if they are wrong, a public service is rendered
in demonstrating it. It may easily happen that some other shift will
better accomplish the purpose, and avoid injustice to existing stations. The only way to find out is to hold a hearing before inflicting
grievous injury not only on the stations but perhaps also on hundreds of thousands of listeners.
Louis G. CALDWELL.
Member of the Chicago Bar.
COMMENTS
AIR COMMERcE REGULATION S-JURISDICTIONI

OF FEDERAL COURT--[U. S.

Dist. Ct. Ohio]-Action at law instituted in Federal District Court. Defendant's dirigible flying at an altitude of about 150 to 200 feet above plain-

tiff's land frightened plaintiff's horses. The horses ran away with the wagon
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that plaintiff was loading and plaintiff was injured. Petition alleged negligence in several particulars, the first of which was in flying at an altitude
lower than 500 feet and thus in violation of the Air Traffic rules promulgated
by the Secretary of Commerce in accordance with the authority given him
by the Air Commerce Act: 49 U. S. C. A. 173-(e). Demurrer overruled.
It did not appear from the petition whether the flight was interstate or
intrastate.
Held: (1) The Air Commerce Act 49 U. S. C. A. Sec. 181-(5) prohibiting
the navigation of aircraft otherwise than in conformity with the air traffic
rules impliedly gave to one injured by a violation of these rules an action
for damages. (2) If defendant's flight were interstate the petition sufficiently
stated plaintiff's claim as one arising under the laws of the United States to
give the federal court jurisdiction the petition alleging a violation of the
Air Commerce Act. If the flight were intrastate, the court would have jurisdiction on the ground of violation of the air traffic rules if it were necessary
to apply the 500 feet minimum altitude rule to intrastate flights in order to
protect interstate movements. (3) If plaintiff be unable to prove any necessity for applying the federal altitude rule to intrastate movements that would
constitute a failure of proof so far as that ground of negligence was concerned; but whether interstate flight or intrastate flight, the petition, setting
up the altitude rule and alleging a negligent violation of the rule to plaintiff's
damage, sufficiently states a case under the federal law which should not be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 35 F. (2d) 761 (Feb. 1929).
The application of the air traffic rules to intrastate flights raises the
question of greatest significance in this case. The case seems to be the first
one arising under the air traffic rules, and in its application to intrastate
flights, is one of first impression. It indicates the attitude which the federal
courts will probably adopt in determining the extent to which the federal
government will be allowed to control aviation.
The first point decided, i. e., that the Air Commerce Act of 1926 impliedly gave a right of action to a person injured by another's violation of
the air traffic rules, admits of but little argument: Texas and Pacific Ry. Co.
v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, 60 L. Ed. 874 (1916). "The Supreme Court has
decided that the Safety Appliance Acts and other similar Acts of Congress,
imposing obligations on railroads to equip their locomotives and cars in the
manner thereby prescribed, create by implication a civil liability for injury or
death resulting from a violation of these acts." (Reynolds, "The Distribution
of Power to Regulate Interstate Carriers Between the Nation and the States,"
p. 345.) That, where a right of action is given by federal law, a suit based
upon that right is within the jurisdiction of the federal courts, is also clear:
"Whenever federal law grants a right of property or of action, and a suit
is brought to enforce that right, such a suit arises under the law creating
the right, within the meaning of statutes defining the jurisdiction of federal
courts": McGoon v. Northern Pacific Ry., 204 F. 998 (1913); Rose's 'Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure," Sec. 230, 234, 958. "Thus, any suit which
seeks to assert a right given by the Interstate Commerce Act, is clearly one
arising under the laws of the U. S.

. .

."

(Sec. 958, supra.)

That the failure to prove the necessity of the application of the altitude
rule to intrastate flights would not deprive the court of jurisdiction is also
well supported by authority: Ward v. Todd, 103 U. S. 327 (1880) ; Sler v.
Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 213 U. S. 175 (1909). As generally stated,
the rule is that if it appears from the plaintiff's complaint that, in any aspect
which the case may assume, the right of recovery may depend upon the construction of Federal Statutes, and if the right of recovery, so far as it turns
upon the construction of such statutes, is not merely a colorable claim, but
rests on a reasonable foundation, a federal question is involved which is adequate to confer jurisdiction, although the right of recovery is also predicated
on other grounds, not involving federal questions, and-although the case is
ultimately decided upon grounds not involving the determination of any federal
question: St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co. v. St. Paul & N. P. R. Co., 68 F. 2
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(1895). Thus, the federal court can acquire jurisdiction through the allegation of violation of the air traffic rule and can then determine the case on
the other allegations of negligence.
From the point of view of air law, however, the important question in
this case is, Do the air triffic rules apply to and govern flights purely intrastate? The answer given by the district court is that they probably do. The
ground on which the federal government is permitted to control intrastate
flights is the familiar "burden on interstate commerce" theory, as appears from
the opinion of West, District Judge: "If the circumstances and conditions
under which air ornmerce is carried on are such that it is necessary for the
altitude rule to apply to and regulate intrastate flights in order to protect
interstate movements, then it will so apply the same as to an interstate
flight. . . . It is apparent that all or nearly all of these rules [air traffic]
must be applied to both intrastate and interstate craft in order to- secure the
safety of the latter, and that with respect to these matters the federal regulations must be paramount. Conflicting state rules could not be allowed." The
court here applies the burden theory, as developed by the railroad, by watercraft, and the telegraph cases, to aircraft with the apparent result that the
federal government is to control all flying, so far as the rules of flights are
concerned. Then comes a concession: "This is not, however, so evident with
respect to the 500 foot altitude rule involved here. It is a little difficult to
see in what respect interstate aircraft navigating at or above the prescribed
elevation can be endangered or interfered with by intra state craft moving in a
lower plane. However dangerous this may be to the intrastate craft and to
persons and property on the ground, the danger to interstate craft is not
apparent."
From the beginning, the power of the federal government to control
aviation, interstate and intrastate, was based upon the commerce clause of
the constitution. The treaty making power, the admiralty power, and the war
power, were all suggested as being sufficient to support a Federal Air Act. The
power over commerce, however, was adopted by Congress as being the most
appropriate and effective basis for federal control over aviation. As soon,
also, as government control of aviation was conceived necessary, it was realized
that the control and regulation, whether Federal or State, must be uniform.
Most writers doubted the power of Congress to control all aviation; accordingly, they advocated a uniform State law. Others thought it possible that
the Supreme Court would uphold federal control of all aviation under the
Commerce power and under the burden theory. The Air Commerce Act
passed in 1926 left the power divided between the nation and the States,
except that it provided that all flying must be done in conformity with the
air traffic rules. (49 U. S. -C. A., Sec. 181 (a)-(5).)The burden theory may be summarized as follows: whenever there exists
such an interblending and interdependency between interstate and intrastate,
commerce that the freedom, well-being, or safety of the former depends upon

the latter, congress, or an administrative body delegated with national authority, may regulate that intrastate commerce in so far as it is necessary to
preserve the freedom, well-being, or safety of the commerce within the exclusive control of the Federal Government. (Robert's "Federal Liabilities of
Carriers," Sec. 14.) Congress may prevent or remove any condition, act or
statute, the effect of which is to burden interstate commerce. This principle,
upon which the Neisuwonger case relies, was furthest extended in the railroad
cases.
There seem to be at least three different kinds of burdens: physical,
financial, and administrative. The best example of physical burdens appears
in the cases under the Safety Appliance Act. This Act provided that certain
safety appliances be used on railroads engaging in interstate commerce. In
Southern Ry. Co. v. U. S., 222 U. S. 20 (1911), a suit to recover penalties for
violation of the act, the defense was that the cars were being used only in
intrastate commerce. The court held that the act must be applied to all cars
used on a railroad engaged in interstate commerce, regardless of whether used
in moving intrastate or interstate traffic, in order to protect those cars used
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in interstate traffic. The analogy between railroad traffic and air traffic,
though not perfect, due to the difference in the nature and extent of the highways, is quite apparent. For other cases on physical burdens, see Sanitary
District of Chicago v. U. S.,.266 U. S. 405 (1925), holding that the federal
government may enjoin the diversion of water from Lake Michigan on the
ground that such continued diversion is an obstruction to interstate commerce;
Western and Atlantic Railroad Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co.. 138 Ga.
420 (1912), holding that a telegraph company will not be permitted to condemo the right of way of a railroad company for the cqnstruction and maintenance of lines of telegraph in such a manner as to materially interfere with
the railroad company in the operation of its trains; and Carter v. U. S., 38 F.
(2d) 227 (1930), to the effect that the Federal Government, in protection of
interstate, commerce, may require the treatment of domestic [intrastate] cattle
to eradicate Texas fever; and numerous cases holding void, as burdens on
interstate commerce, state statutes requiring railroads to make certain switch
connections or stops.
The most recent extension of the burden principle has been its application to the rates of railroad carriers. Where intrastate rates are so low that
interstate carriers coming in competition with the intrastate carriers are forced
to incuase their rates in other districts in order to makhe up for the loss
resulting, the Interstate Commerce Commission has power to increase the
intrastate rates to remove the burden upon or discriminations against interstate
comMe'ce: The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 (1912), The Shreveport
Case, 234 U. S. 342 (1913), New York v. U. S., 257 U. S. 59 (1921), and
Railroad Commission v. C. B. & Q. Ry., 257 U. S. 563 (1921). These decisions show a disposition to sustain the exercise of federal authority over commerce purely intrastate whenever the Court is able to discern a reasonably
close connection between the subject of federal legislation and interstate commerce. (Reynold's "The Distribution of Power" supra, p. 143; Beale and
Wyman, "Railroad Rate Regulation." Sec. 100; Fuller, "Interstate Commerce," p. 67.)
The burden principle has been applied in many other types of situations:
Ailantic-Pacific Stages v. Stahl, 36 F. (2d) 260 (1929), applied to a state
statute requiring carriers to secure a certificate of convenience and necessity;
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Boegli, 251 U. S. 315 (1920), a state statute
penalizing the telegraph company for delay in delivery of messages.; Shafer v.
Farmer's Grain Co., 268 U. S. 189, a state statute regulating the sale of
domestic grown wheat; and other cases on statutes licensing, taxing, and otherwise regulating commerce.
The Neis-wonger case, in extending the burden principle to air flights, has
followed the trend of the Supreme Court as indicated very clearly by the
burden cases, especially the Safety Appliance Cases and the Rate Cases. The
same attitude has been adopted in the decisions involving federal control over
radio: Whitehurst v. Grimes, 21 F. (2d) 787 (1927): "Radio Communications are all interstate. This is so, though they may be intended only. for
intrastate transmission; and interstate transmission of such communications
may be seriously afftcted by communications intended only for intrastate
transmission. Such communications admit of and require a uniform system
of regulation and control through-out the United States, and Congress has
covered the field by appropriate legislation. It follows that the ordinance
[imposing a license on radio broadcastersl is void, as a regulation of interstate commerce." Accord: U. S. v. American Bond. ajd Mortgage Co., 31
F. (2d) 448 (1929).
Another possible approach towards the question of federal control over
intrastate ayiation is in treating the air as a highway and as subject to the
same control as are navigable waters. (Kintz, "The Federal Air Traffic Rules,"
I Air Law Review, p. 265; Zollmann, "Governmental Control-of Aircraft," 53
Am. L. R. 897.) Were the rules -regarding navigable vaters, as laid down
in The Oyster Police Steamers of Maryland, 31 F. 763 (1887), applied to air
travel, state control over aviation would be insignificant. The framers of the
Air Commerce Act favored the Commerce power rather than the admiralty
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power, but if for any reason the commerce power proves inadequ4te to support federal control over aviation, we shall probably see the navigable water
analogy attempted. The history of the cases under the admiralty power,
however, throws a serious doubt upon the possibility of so applying the power.
The Neiswonger case has been supported to some extent by dicta in Craig
v. Boein1 Air Tr~n~po,-t, Inc., 1929 U. S. Av. Rep. 101 (Oct. 1929) : "It may
be conceded that such a suit at law for violation of an air traffic rule would
be one arising under the laws of the United States and removable, but before
it can be so held. it must be clear that _a violation of such rule is alleged."
Seven years ago, William P. MacCracken ("Air Law," 57 Am. L. Rev. 97,
1923), predicted that federal control over intrastate flights would probably be
constitutional and state authority very limited. The means suggested was the
burden principle. The prediction seems in a fair way to be realized. If the
Supreme Court will uphold the application of the air traffic rules to all
flights, state control will be very limited. The Safety Appliance cases, the
Rate cases, the Radio cases, and the Neiswonger case all point to such a
result and most of the writers on the subject have anticipated such federal
control. (Zollmuan, "Law of the Air," Secs. 48, 50, 52, 58; Logan, "Aircraft
Law Made Plair" pp. 34, 38, 41; Fixel, "Law of Aviation," pp. 109, 113;
Wooley and Hill, "Airplane Transportation," p. 328 (Article by W. P. MacCracken) ; Greer, "Aviation From a Legal Point of View," 15 A. B. A. Journal 305, 308; People v. Smith, 196 N. Y. S. 241, 1922.)
That the States will still have some control over aviation is admitted on
all sides. The Air Commerce Act itself includes by its terms intrastate flights
only in regard to the air traffic rules. Licensing, taxing, inspection, and -other
regulations are not exclusively within the federal power.
As for the air traffic rules, the weak point in the argument for their
application to all flights is that it is conceivable that there may be intrastate
flights under conditions which do not "in any wise interfere or impinge upon
interstate flying." (Hotchkiss, "Ayiation Laws," Sec. 57.) If-it is possible
that intrastate flights under one set of regulations would not endanger or
interfere with interstate flights under a different set of regulations in regard
to altitude, speed, signals, lights, ejmergency landings, etc., then the constitutionality of exclusive federal control would seem dubious. As pointed out in
the Neiswonger case, the possibility of interference with interstate commerce
in the case of the altitude rule is not free from doubt. In the case of
emergency landings and in inclement weather, however, the altitude rule, also,
would seem to call for a single control. As planes and flights increase in
number and complexity, the necessity for uniformity, and the probability that
intrastate flights will be considered as essentially connected with interstate
commerce, will become all the greater. Until the Supreme Court acts, the
extent of federal control will be uncertain. Everything seems to point to
a federal control over aircraft similar to that exercised over railroads.
ABRAHAM FISHMAN.
AIRcRAFT-COLLISION-DEGREE OF CARE REQUIRED IN CONDUCT AND OPERSupreme Court of Wisconsin has recently had before it an interesting question, namely, the amount of
care required to be used by an aviator in landing a plane so as to exempt him,
or his employers, if he happens to be an agent, from liability for damages
caused to a plane stalled on the runway. Greunke v. North America. Air,ways Co. (1930), 230 N. W. 618.
The defendant operated an airport maintaining, as part of its business,
hangar rental, transportation of passengers, freight and mail, and a school of
instruction for students. West, an agent of the defendants and a licensed
transport pilot, operated the plane which caused the accident. The plaintiff,
who was also a licensed transport pilot, owned a plane which he kept at the
defendant's hangar. The day on which the accident occurred, West, in the
course of instructing a student, preceded the plaintiff in the air. West made
one or two landings while the plaintiff was in the air but went back up. The
plaintiff came in landing on the runway but making a "dead sticW' landing,
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i.e., a landing made with a stalled motor. While he was endeavoring to
start the motor, in order to get the machine off the runway, West came in and
touched thC runway, bounced, and thereafter collided with the plaintiff's plane,
causing considerable damage to both machines. The action was brought to
recover damages. The defendant alleged that West used care in making his
landing, but that owing to the light at the time and the color of the plaintiff's
machine, ift was difficult to see the plane standing on the runway. There was
also some evidence of a custom to pull stalled planes off the runway in accordance with the rule that "landing planes have the right of way over aircraft on the ground." (U. S. Dept. of Commerce Rules of Flying.)
The court held that the rules of law applicable to torts on land would
apply. In its instructions to the jury the trial court said: "West was to use
the highest degree of care the men of reasonable vigilance and foresight
ordinarily exercise in the practical conduct and operation of an airplane and
making a landing." On appeal, this was held to be prejudicial error and that
West's duty was to use ordinary care as that term has been defined saying
that, "ordinary care, however, is not the highest degree of care that men of
reasonable vigilance and foresight ordinarily exercise in the practical conduct of their affairs." "Without doubt the defendant was required to use a
high degree of cars, which care would be the care that the great mass of men,
so circumstanced as he, would ordinarily use."
The rules of law applicable to torts on land under such circumstances are
as follows: If a man engage in an act which the circumstances indicate may
be dangerous to others he must take all the care which prudence would suggest to avoid an injury. McGrew v. Stone (1866), 53 Pa. St. 436. More
vigilance and caution are required in the doing of acts at a place where injury
is liable to occur from them than where no injury may be anticipated:
Indianapolis Union Ry. Co. v. Boettcher (1891), 131 Ind. 82. The controlling
test of the exercise of reasonable care is not what has been the practice of
others in a like situation, but what a reasonably prudent man would have done
in such a situation: Chi. Mil. & St. P. R. Co. v. Moore (1909), 166 Fed. 663.
"High degree of care" denotes no more than a degree of care commensurate
with the risk of danger: N. I. Fid. & Plate Glass Ins. Co. v. Lehigh Valley
R. R. Co. (1918) 92 N. J. L. 467. Ordinary care is not a constant but a varying condition, dependent upon each particular case and proportioned to the
dangerous nature of the instrumentality employed and the probability of injury: Tyler v. Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1918), 143 La. 177. The highest
degree of care is not required of operators of automobiles on the public highways, but the driver is under the duty of exercising reasonable care to avoid
inflicting injury to others who may be lawfully using the same highway:
Tenn. Mill & Feed Co. v. Giles (1924), 211 Ala. 44. The operator of an automobile on a public highway must use such care as a reasonably prudent man
would under like circumstances, the highest degree of care not being exacted:
Hester v. Hall (1914), 17 Ala. App. 25. The operator of an automobile must
use such a degree of care in the operation of the machine with a view of
averting injury to others: Henderson v. O'Leary (1922), 177 Wis. 130. In
determining what is reasonable or ordinary care, control over the instru-

mentality claimed to have caused the injury is an element for consideration,
and the amount of prudence and vigilance which must be exercised in order to
reach the required standard increases with one's increased power of control
over such instrumentality: 8 C. J. 695. If we may assume some analogy
between aircraft and automobiles, we are aware that, automobiles are not to
be regarded as dangerous per se: Parker v. Wilson (1912), 179 Ala. 361;
Landry v. Oversen (19191, 187 Ia. 284; Cunningham v. Castle (1908), 127 N.
Y. App. Div. 580. Also automobiles are not to be regarded in the same category with locomotives, dynamite, and other dangerous contrivances: Vincent
v. Crandall & Godley Co. (1909), 115 N. Y. S. 600; Goodman v. Wilson
(1914), 129 Tenn. 464; Steffan v. McNaughton (1910), 142 Wis. 49.
The instructions which the lower court gave to the jury seem to be based
on the theory that the care which should be required would be based on the
instrumentality used and the circumstances involved in the situation, following
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the rules quoted above; and that while an airplane is not per se a dangerous
instrument, still it is such an instrumentality as requires one to use the highest
degree of care in its operation. The Supreme Court in holding that this was
prejudicial error held that the pilot's duty was not to use the highest degree
of care but ordinary care which, being a varying figure according to the instrument used, would be a high degree of care in the case of aircraft. The question might be raised as to how the jury is to distinguish between "highest
degree of care that men of reasonable vigilance use in the practical conduct
and operation of aD airplane and making a landing," and the instruction that
the test is whether or not the pilot used ordinary care, defining ordinary care
as meaning a high degree of care which men so circumstanced as he (meaning
men landing a plane?) would use.
From the standpoint of air law the case merely holds that the operator
of an airplane is not required to use the highest degree of care but some high
degree of care considering the instrument used and which is here held to be
included in the phrase "ordinary care."
Wm,K. TELL.
AIRPORT-OPERATION

BY CITY-LIABILITY

OF CITY

FOR DAMAGES

NEGLIGENT OPERATION OF MUNICIPAL AiRPORT- [Alabama] -The

FROM

plaintiff, a

property owner, brought an action against the City of Mobile for damages
caused to his property by reason of the draining of a municipal airport
owned and operated by the defendant municipality. It appeared that the
plaintiff was a lower, servient owner whose property adjoined the airport,
but that in draining the airport, ditches were constructed under the direction
of the city engineer in such a manner that the natural flow of water upon the
plaintiff's land was greatly increased with the result that his bean crop was
destroyed. The defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that it
was exercising a governmental function in the maintenance of the airport, and
therefore was not liable. The demurrer was overruled, and a jury in the
circuit court found $350 damages for the plaintiff. Upon appeal this decision
was affirmed in the appellate court: City of Mobile v. Lartique (Ala. App.
1930) 127 S. 256.
It is well settled that, in absence of a statute, a city is not liable in tort
for the negligence of its agents where such negligence occurs in the discharge
of a governmental function as distinguished from a corporate function:
City of Wooster v. Arbenz 116 Oh. St. 281, 156 N. E. 210 (1927); Ham-mon v.
City of Waterbury (1927) 106 Conn. 13, 136 Ati. 876; Bolster v. Lawrence
(1917) 225 Mass. 387, 114 N. E. 722; Scibilia v. Philadelphia (1924) 279 Pa.
549, 124 Atl. 273; Roumbos v. City of Chicago (1928) 332 Il. 70, 163 N. E.
361; Dillon, Municipal Corporations (5th ed.) Vol. 4 § 1625 seq.; 19 R. C.
L. 392; 43 C. J. 921. The court in the instant case recognized this generally
admitted non-liability of municipalities in their discharge of governmental
functions, but concluded that a city in operating an airport is not in the
exercise of a governmental power. It was a case of first impression in
Alabama, and. it is to be believed, in the country.
While the distinction as concerns tort liability between governmental and
corporate powers of a city is well known, the application to a particular set
of facts has often proved troublesome to the courts, and has led to divergent
views throughout the country. However, it seems quile well settled that a
municipality is not liable for injuries due to the defective condition or
negligent management of its property when used for the following purposes:
school buildings: Howard v. Worcester, 153 Mass. 426, 27 N. E. 11; Daniels
v. Grand Rapids, 191 Mich. 339, 158 N. W. 23; police and fire stations:
Wilcox v. Rochester, 190 N. Y. 137, 82 N. E. 1119; State v. Joplin, 189 Mo.
App. 383, 176 S.W. 341; prisons: Evans v. Kankakee; 231 Ill.
223, 83 N. E.
223; Bowling Green v. Rogers, 142 Ky. 558, 134 S. W. 921, and hospitals:
Bolster v. Lcarence, cit. supra. In the maintenance of public parks, streets,
and sewers the decisions are not so uniform. Some courts have found them
governmental functions: Nelson v. City of Spokane (Wash. 1918), 176 P.
149; Luebken v. City of Hanover (Kansas), 283 P. 501; Harris v. District of
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Columbia, 256 U. S. 650, 41 S. Ct. 610, 43 C. J. 972, 977, 1170; others have
found them corporate functions with consequent liability: City of Waco v.
Branch (Texas 1928), 5 S. W. 2nd 498; Denver v. Porter, 126 Fed. 288
(Colo.); Van Dyke v. Utica, 196 N. Y. S. 277; Barthold v. Philadelphia,154
Pa. 109, 26 At. 304.
Alabama, itself, is committed to the doctrine that the maintenance of
public streets and sidewalks is a corporate rather than a governmental function: City of Birmingham v. Whitworth, 218 Ala. 603 (1929). But the same
court has found, in a recent case, that a city in maintaining a public park is
exercising a governmental function, and therefore is not liable for the negligent management of a public golf links in the park: Williams v. City of
Birmingham, 219 Ala. 19 (1929).
The court in the instant case was inclined to feel that the operation of an
airport was more akin to the maintenance of public streets than of public
parks, and so found the city liable. As indicated the precise question had not
arisen before, and the Alabama court was not bound by any conclusive decision either in its own courts or the courts of the other states.
The adjudicated cases on municipal airports in this country up to the
present time have been concerned with the right of cities to establish airports
under state legislation, and their power to issue bonds or levy taxes for their
erection and maintenance. The majority of the state legislatures have directly
authorized their municipalities to establish such airports: 1929 U. S. Aviation
Reports, 403-876; and the reported cases have been uniform in holding that
cities may incur indebtedness in acquiring and maintaining airports: City of
Wichita v. Clapp (1928), 125 Kan. 100, 263 P. 12; Dysart v. City of St. Louis
(1928), 11 S. W. 2nd 1045; Douty v. Mayor of Baltimore (Md. 1928), 141 At.
499; Hesse v. Rath (1928), 249 N. Y. 435, 164 N. E. 342; State ex rel. Hile v.
City of Cleveland (Ohio 1927), 160 N. E. 241; Ennis v. Kansas City (Mo.
1928), 11 S. W. 2nd 1054; State ex rel. City of Lincoln v. Johnson (Neb.
1928), 220 N. W. '273; McClintock v. City of Roseburg (Ore. 1929), 273 P.
331. Thus only indirectly has the nature of a municipality's function in
establishing and maintaining an airport been passed upon. The establishment
of an airport is a public purpose: Dysart v. St. Louis, supra; Ennis v. Kansas
City, supra; is a city purpose: Hesse v. Rath, supra. Three courts have said
an airport is a public utility, for the support of which a city may issue bonds:
City of Lincoln v. Johnson, supra; Hile v. City of' Cleveland, supra; or levy
taxes: McClintock v. City of Roseburg, supra. In a recent Kansas case it has
been held that the devotion of a reasonable portion of a public park to an
airport comes within the legitimate use of public parks: City of Wichita v.
Clapp, supra.
In arriving at its conclusion the Alabama court was inclined to pour new
wine into old bottles, and this presented a convenient, though not necessarily
a definitive answer to a question which is bound to arise again in other states.
Whether the decision in the instant case will be followed is conjectural, but
along these lines several observations may be made.
All states do not accept Alabama's application of the distinction between
governmental and corporate functions, as is shown by the fact that in several
jurisdictions cleaning, repairing, and oiling of city streets is a governmental
function: Louisville v. Hehemann, 161 Ky. 523, 171 S. W. 165; Johnson v.
Somerville, 195 Mass. 370, 81 N. E. 268; and cases cited supra. Thus, even
accepting the analogy of the Alabama court, others may come to a different
decision. Akgain, it is to be noticed that Alabama is one of the states in which
the establishment of airports by municipalities has not been authorized by the
state legislature. see 1929 U. S. Av. R. cit. supra. Just what significance this
fact has, is not entirely clear, but in view of the fact that many of the acts
have impliedly recognized the governmental nature of the function of establishing and maintaining municipal airports: (see especially laws of Georgia,
Kentucky, Connectjcut, Ohio, Montana in 1929 N. S. Av. R. 403) it may
become an important distinction in future adjudications of this question.
Lastly, it is to be pointed out that at least four states have recognized expressly the governmental nature of the function by providing that a municipal-
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ity shall not be liable for negligence in the operation or maintenance of an
airport. Two of these statutes providing for non-liability is limited to injuries to persons: Texas Laws,. 1929 Ch. 28, § 3; Wisconsin Laws, 1929 Ch. 464,
§1; one is not so limited: S. Carolina Laws, 1929 Act 562, § 2; and the other
provides that the liability shall be no greater than that imposed for the maintenance of public parks: Iowa Laws, 1929 Ch. 138, § 9. As suggested by an
Alabama court in Williams v. City of Birmingham, supra, this question is
ultimately one fot judicial interpretation and not legislative declaration, yet it
is not clear that considerable weight would not be given to such a legislative
provision. The Alabama court admitted that it did so in the Williams case
where it faced a statutory declaration that the maintenance of public parks
was a governmental function or power. It is at least to be noted that the
appellate court in the instant case had no such statutory declaration to contend with.
DOUGLASS PILLINGER,
AIRCRAFT -

AIRPORT-

TRESPASS -

NUISANCE -

COMMON

LAW DOCTRINE

MoDIFIED-[Massachusetts]-Plaintiff owned a large country estate next to
which the defendant company acquired land for a private airport, and in its
operation many flights were made over the entire estate at high altitudes, one
or two flights at less than 50 feet, and numerous flights as low as 100 feet
over the outlying wood track nearest the air port in taking off and landing
"whenever the conditions of wind and weather has made it necessary or convenient." No direct damage resulted, and the master found that the noise
from the flying planes was not so great or so continuous as to materially
interfere with the material comfort of persons of ordinary sensibilities so as
to constitute a nuisance. The owner sought an injunction to prohibit flying
above his property "solely on the ground of trespass and the nuisance resulting from its continuance," and to prohibit the operation of the airport because
it must necessarily result in trespassers over the plaintiff's land. The lower
court denied the injunction, and the Supreme Court, in a somewhat circuitous
opinion, upheld the lower court: Harry Worcester Smith et al. v. New
England Aircraft Co., Inc. et al. (Mass. 1930) 170 N. E. 385.
For thg first time the Supreme Court of any state was squarely presented
with a question of the property rights of the subjacent owner in the airspace
above his land, and the use of the action of trespass to prevent invasion by
airplanes. Although jurists had discussed the question at length (Zollmann,
"Law of the Air" (1927) pp. 1-29; Hotchkiss "Aviation Law" (1928) pp. 1227; Hazeltine, "Law of the Air" (1910) pp. 74-78) there have bcen only two
decisions in this country, both by lower courts, passing upon the question
of trespass by airplane prior to the present case. (Commonwealth v. Nevin
(Pa. 1922) 2 Dist. and County Rep. 241; Johnson v. Curtis Northwest Airplane Co. (Minn. 1923) 1928 U. S. Av. R. 242; see Hotchkiss p. 21.)
The
right of harmless passage was in each case upheld, as has been done in the
few continental cases which have considered the question. (Assinquant Mange
v. Societe Farman (1913) 21 Jurid. Rev. 321; Huertebrisev. Esnault Pelterie
Farman (1919) 53 Am. L. Rev. 732.)
The present court assumed that the underlying owner's rights were
limited to "the airspace which is now used or may in the future be used in
the development of the underlying land." The plaintiff referred to the Latin
maxim "Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum," but expressly refrained
from basing his action on its literal interpretation as granting to him, the
subjacent owner, complete property rights to al l heights. He argued that the
flights made by the defendant as low as 100 feet interfered with the present
use of the estate, and was suffic.ient basis for his action At settlement of the
vexed question of whether the underlying 9wnel: has exclusive control of the
airspace above his property to all heights was thus reached by the form of
the pleadings. This at once assumes that the subjacent owner has vested
rights in the upper airspace, and that those rights are limited to the space
necessary for the present use of his property. The function of the Federal
and Massachusetts Air Navigation Acts was to define the upper extent of
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the exclusive property rights of the land owner-500 feet being the limit when
the property is not used by tall buildings. The statutes are passed under the
authority of the police power to regulate a right to fly, which already existed, in the interest of safety. To account foy the arbitrariness of the
statutes in fixing a definite limit to the property rights, the court declared
that the legislature has the power to take away private rights in order to
preserve the public's right to fly at a reasonable height.
The court asserted the following rules of law upon which it based its
decision:
(1) The upper airspace is within the jurisdiction of the State, and is
not detached from sovereign control as are the high seas.
(2)
The private ownership of the airspace is assumed to be limited in
altitude to what is necessary for the present use of the property.
(3)
The Federal Air Navigation Act and the Massachusetts Statute do
not create a right to navigate the air, but merely recognizes the already existing right to fly over private property, and regulates it through the exercise
of the police power.
(4)
The legislature may fix an arbitrary altitude above which flying
will be permitted-55 feet in the open country-unless the landowner makes
use of his land by building to an unusual height.
(5)
In fixing the altitude for flying, the legislature may properly delimit
the private rights of the landowner under the police power in adjusting his
conflicting interests with those of the public in flying.
(6) Flying below the statutory limit constitutes a technical trespass,
except in cases of take-offs and landings, when a reasonable height is permitted.
(7) An injunction against flying below the statutory limit will not be
granted for mere repeated trespasses when no right of easement will follow,
unless the trespass amounts to a nuisance because of noice, vibration, or frequency of flights.
In applying the above rules of law to the situation confronted, the court
concluded:
(1) That flying above 500 feet did not constitute a trespass;
(2) That the one or two flights at less than 500 feet and the probability of
similar flights in the future did not warrant injunctive relief, as no injury or
interference with the valuable use of the plaintiff's property had been shown;
(3) That the flights as low as 100 feet in taking off and landing were an
unreasonable invasion, and constituted trespasses, but that an injunction would
not be granted as the subjacent land was woodland and the flights did not
interfere with its utility; (4) That nominal damages for trespass would not
be granted because the plaintiff asked only for an injunction.
The outcome reached by the court is the only one compatible with the
development of air transportation. If every ffight over private property
were a trespass, for whose repetition the owner could secure an injunction,
the effect on aviation would be fatal. (19 Green Bag 708.)
The authority
for the extreme view of property rights lies in the literal acceptance of the
"cujus est solum" maxim, which was introduced into England during the
reign of Edward I, when flying was only a fanciful dream. The purpose of a
maxim is to summarize the law and not to extend it. "To the extent that the
maxim cujus est solum has been actually applied..by the courts, to that extent
is it law." (Bouv., "Private Ownership in Airspace," 1 Air Law Review,
232, 248.)
The cases applying the maxim involve trespasses relatively near
the surface.such as shooting over anotler's land (Kenyon v. Hart (1865)
34 Law Journal Rep. 87; Clinton v. Berry (1888) 4 Time L. R. 8), overhanging tree branches (Grandona v. Lovdal (1889) 78 Cal. 611), projecting
cornices (Harringtonv. McCarthy (1897) 169 Mass. 492), protruding buildings (Codnina v. Evans (1863) 89 Mass. 431), and thrusting arms over division fences (Hannabalson v. Session (1902) 116 Ia. 457). One writer, in
commenting on this case (1 Air Law Review 272), shows that there could
necessarily be no case authority for the invasion of the upper airspace until
the recent development of aviation, and the authority is confined to declarations of jurists and the dicta of cases.
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While the actual decision of the case represents a fair compromise
between the interests of the landowner and the aviator, the opinion of the
court is obscured by the original assumption that the property rights of the
underlying owner only "extend to all reasonable heights above the underlying land." This leaves the question unanswered as to the extent of the
ground owner's rights in unoccupied airspace if the plaintiff's pleading had
not been restricted as it was in this case. If there had been no statutory
limitations upon these rights the court would have been called upon to decide
what was the reasonable extent of the landowner's rights, and if the plaintiff
had not admitted that his rights were limited to a reasonable extent, then the
court would have had to decide if reasonableness was the criterion for measuring their extent. Unfortunately this deprived aviation of the decision of an
important court on the extent to which the landowner can claim Xights to the
upper space, and the court did not choose to grasp the opportunity to settle
this question before considering the question of the reasonableness of the
defendant's flight in the situation before it.
EDWARD C. SWEENEY.

